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Asia Society AustralAsia
Centre/ Australia-India Business Council
Asia Foreign Policy Update Luncheon
Sydney, Friday, 27 June 2003
"INDIA'S CHANGING REGIONAL
AND GLOBAL OUTLOOK - AND EMERGING OPPORTUNITIES FOR AUSTRALIA AS
A RESULT OF SHIFTING POLICIES"
H.E. MS PENNY WENSLEY AO
AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER TO INDIA
Introduction
Good afternoon, Ladies and Gentlemen
Thank you Dick, for that warm introduction
and thank you to the Asia Society, the AIBC and DFAT Sydney office
for arranging this function.
I appreciate the effort involved, not only in organising it but
in attracting such a large and diverse crowd. I am pleased there
is such interest in India and in Australia-India relations.
I note particularly - and welcome the presence of a number of senior
diplomatic colleagues: the Ambassador of the Philippines, the Consul-General
of Korea, the Indonesian and New Zealand Consuls-General as well
as of course, the Indian Consul-General and representative of several
Indian organisations and enterprises including the Indian press.
Like my kind colleague, John McCarthy, who addressed the forum in
April, I feel somewhat awkward about telling people about their
own country, but hope they and you will find value in my impressions
and observations after some twenty months in India - i.e. just past
the mid-point of my posting.
On these mid-term consultations, I have addressed audiences in Perth,
Melbourne, Hobart and Canberra (and still have Brisbane to address).
The focus has been on Australia-India relations in business and
doing business in India, but for this audience I wanted to approach
the subject in a different way.
Australia and India do not know enough about the contemporary reality
of each other - we telescope in on particular issues from time to
time, but the larger picture is not in focus. It is blurred by outdated
impressions, simplistic stereotypes and assumptions.
Neither country fully appreciates the changes taking place, the
sophistication of certain developments/sectors, the capabilities
and strengths of each other and the significant complementarities
and opportunities that result from these changes.
There is a strong need to raise awareness change perceptions stimulate
more interest in each other to update our ideas to achieve a modern,
mature, more sophisticated relationship.
I don't want to sell our relations short - actually, they have never
been in better shape: we are on a growth trajectory in all areas,
but; if its real promise is to be realised and fulfilled, we should,
I believe, be taking a more comprehensive, strategic approach viewing
India and placing the relationship in a wider context.
Changes - and continuity - in Australia's foreign and economic policy
orientation in the dynamic past few decades are well known to us.
The changes in the international environment - the dominance of
globalisation, the threat of terrorism - are also now commonly recognised.
Today I want to focus on the third part of the picture - the major
changes that have taken place in India's foreign policy outlook
in the past decade or so, and what these mean for Australia.
India's changing outlook. India’s diplomacy today is active
in many directions - India is working to strengthen its relations
with the United States, Europe, China, Southeast Asia, key states
of the Asia-Pacific, Central Asia, the Middle East and Africa, and
more.
Of course relations with Pakistan remain to the fore of Indian concerns.
But more than ever before, India's international outlook faces many
directions, and focuses on a very broad range of themes - from transnational
security problems to multilateral trade arrangements, from the future
of the United Nations to the nature of the global strategic framework,
from mutually benefical relations with its smaller neighbours to
new modes of partnership with global powers.
Official travel illustrates the story. This week, Prime Minister
Vajpayee is on a historic visit to China, with three senior Ministers
and a large business delegation, and he has returned recently from
visits to Russia and Germany and meetings with other G8 leaders.
A few weeks ago Deputy Prime Minister Advani was in the United States
and the United Kingdom. Last month India's National Security Adviser
Brajesh Mishra was in Tehran, Kabul, Washington, London, Paris,
in the space of a week.
The traffic into New Delhi is just
as busy. Last week the Indian capital was visited by the Foreign
Minister of Russia and the Prime Minister of Laos, the latest in
a series of senior ASEAN visitors. Every week India hosts high-ranking
international visitors, whether heads of state or Ministers or senior
officials; a pattern that has accelerated noticeably even in the
two years I have been in New Delhi. These visits are much more than
a parade. They are substantive. India is weaving a strong fabric
of dialogues, agreements and understandings. For my colleagues in
South Block - the Indian Ministry of External Affairs - these are
exciting and demanding times.
I should acknowledge that not every
voice in India entirely agrees on the desirability of the country's
growing global engagement - hardly surprising in a country that
has an exceptionally robust press with room for every shade of opinion.
In some quarters there is debate about the merits of closer engagement
with the United States or the global economy. In some corners there
remain those who still seek spurious refuge in economic autarchy
or political isolationism or ideological purity.
And even among the large body of Indian
opinion that welcomes and favours the new Indian foreign policy
outlook, there is not quite consensus about the precise origins
of this historic shift.
Some attribute it primarily to the
current Government, to the open-minded vision and calculations of
its senior foreign policy decision-makers. Few would contest that
the transformation is intrinsically related to the economic liberalisation
that began in the early 1990s, as well as to the political adjustments
compelled by the end of the Cold War. But some see the seeds of
today’s Indian diplomacy in the effort of Rajiv Gandhi’s
Government to modernise Indian’s international outlook in
the 1980s. And a few even claim that Nehru's idea of non-alignment
was always meant to balance idealism with pragmatism, so that today's
Indian diplomacy is just a change of emphasis in a country which
produced one of the world's earliest texts on statecraft, the Arthashastra,
in the 4th century BC.
Fascinating as they are, these are
domestic Indian debates. What matters most from Australia's perspective
is that we recognise - and we welcome - the present reality. Indian
foreign policy has changed.
The changes have been deliberate and
conscious, even if they are in places incremental, or couched in
language of continuity. The hallmarks of today's Indian international
outlook include pragmatism and the placement of national interest
– and not ideology - as the prime organising principle. In
that sense, it is fair to say there is a natural resonance between
India’s contemporary foreign policy and Australia’s,
which bodes well for the deepening of our bilateral relationship.
Perhaps the key question in the minds
of many observers of Indian foreign and economic policy is: are
the changes irreversible? The answer from a range of important figures
in New Delhi's foreign policy community - including National Security
Adviser Mishra - is an unequivocal yes. There may be fluctuations,
there may be changes in personal style or areas of focus, and even
temporary setbacks or distractions, but fundamentally there is no
going back. Little wonder that a recent book tracing India's new
foreign policy by one of the country's most influential commentators,
Raja Mohan who is shortly to visit Australia under our Special Visits
Program, was titled "Crossing the Rubicon".
In all directions the most prominent
reflection of India's changed foreign policy outlook is the transformation
of its relations with the United States. This has become especially
marked in the past three years. Not all observers would be as direct
as India's then External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh reportedly
told journalists on the eve of the Clinton visit to India in 2000,
when he described the previous fifty years of the relationship as
"five wasted decades". But certainly there was a story
of opportunity lost, of potential partnership between these two
vast democracies being frozen by unlooked-for circumstance, especially
the Cold War.
That much has changed beyond recognition.
The Indian Prime Minister has spoken of the United States as a natural
ally. Today these two countries enjoy close dialogue and political
understanding on a broad range of issues; healthy and growing trade
and investment links; exceptional people-to-people ties; and a growing
relationship on strategic issues, including defence engagement such
as joint exercises and even a cooperative naval escort arrangement
in the Straits of Malacca.
While differences may persist in some
areas, these are being addressed in an open and constructive way
which ensures they do not overshadow the wider mutually beneficial
relationship. And the unprecedented strength of the U.S.-India relationship
has implications for their mutual understanding, cooperation or
coincidence of interests on wider regional and global issues.
You may not read about it in the Australian
newspapers, but I will mention two foreign policy stories that have
made headlines regularly in India in recent weeks. Neither of these
are stories we would expect to have seen a decade ago. The first
is a U.S. request for India - with its impressive record of UN peacekeeping
- to contribute to the international stabilisation force in Iraq,
a possibility that the Indian Government is understood to be looking
at very seriously. The second is the interchange of views among
the United States, India and Pakistan on the recent and very welcome
thaw in India-Pakistan relations. This is of course very much a
bilateral process between India and Pakistan. But there is clearly
a substantial level of confidence on India's part in engaging with
the United States on questions of India-Pakistan relations and regional
peace and stability.
Some Indian commentators like to suggest
that improved relations with the United States were the catalyst
for the momentum of many other countries in engaging with India
in recent years. That is a simplistic argument, which misses that
point that many countries have their own practical interests in
closer relations with India, just as India has its own reasons for
multi-faceted international engagement.
Time won't permit me too detailed a survey of all the relationships
India is building. There is just too much to tell. The activity
is in almost every direction.
So, for example, I am not downplaying
the importance of the issue when I note only in passing the efforts
to shape a strategic partnership from the longstanding bonds between
India and Russia. Or the renewed focus of Indian diplomacy on its
smaller immediate neighbours. Then there are India's growing links
with the European Union. Or its engagement with the Islamic world
- India after all has the world's second largest Muslim population.
And its partnership with the new Afghanistan, where India is playing
a significant role in reconstruction and development. Or a substantive
and mutually beneficial relationship with Israel, which has grown
rapidly in just 11 years of formal diplomatic relations. Or what
some observers see as a recent renewal of interest in Africa which
goes beyond such established contexts as UN, the Non-Aligned Movement
or the Commonwealth. And India is exploring new modes of co-operation,
fir example, the Foreign Ministers of India, Brazil and South Africa
met last month in the first exchange in what is loosely being termed
the G3. India, while growing its relations on a wide front, is promoting
its traditional links and role with the developing world.
Speaking of these international bodies,
India remains productively engaged in multilateralism, including
in the United Nations, where it promotes its credentials as a possible
candidate for a permanent seat on any reformed or updated Security
Council.
I have had to resort to a list, but
its sheer length reinforces the central point - that India's international
outlook is multi-directional, its agenda extremely full. As for
commenting in any detail, I will restrict myself to a few relationships
and subjects of especial interest to Australia. The relationships
are India's "Look East" policy, the continuing progress
in India-China ties, and the welcome developments in India's relations
with Pakistan. The subjects are trade and economic development,
energy supply, and the vibrant global success story that is the
Indian diaspora.
"Look East" is the appellation
give to India's policy to engage comprehensively with Southeast
Asia - an intention announced formally in 1994 - and, beyond that,
with the wider Asia-Pacific. Indian commentators typically define
the strengthened India-Australia relationship as within this broad
orientation.
The Look East imperative has mutually-reinforcing
economic, political and strategic dimensions. It has involved reinforcing
bilateral political relations with the countries of ASEAN, with
Japan and others, as well as developing political, economic and
people-to-people links and dialogues at plurilateral or subregional
levels. Last November India held its first summit dialogue with
ASEAN leaders collectively.
The past decade has seen manifold
expansion of trade and investment between India and the region and
the pursuit of more liberal trading arrangements. The Look East
agenda also has implications for the development of India's North-eastern
states, for instance through creating a road infrastructure to link
them with neighbouring Southeast Asia.
On strategic matters, India has since
1996 been a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum - the region's security
dialogue mechanism - and has supported the forum's increasingly
practical focus on the regional challenges posed by terrorism and
other transnational security issues. India has also strengthened
its bilateral security relations with a number of states in the
region.
Related to but also going well beyond
the Look East policy, is the constructive engagement between India
and China. The problematic aspects of the historical relationship
between the world's two most populous countries, are well known,
but what is perhaps less reported internationally are the advances
in recent years. Representatives of both countries have publicly
spoken of putting to one side for the time being their unresolved
differences over a 4000km Himalayan boundary, and moving ahead instead
with building bridges in trade, investment and people-people relations,
as well as wide-ranging dialogue, including on shared security concerns
such as terrorism. Though from a low base, bilateral trade and investment
between India and China is growing dramatically. The direct air
link between Delhi and Beijing, established a year ago, is both
symbolic and a channel for business and people-to-people interaction.
Without pre-empting the Indian Prime Minister, it is safe to say
that his visit to China, which concludes today, will have played
a significant part in consolidating the trust essential for further
progress.
There is now scope for progress also
in India's relations with Pakistan. Like the rest of the world,
Australia has watched India's relations with Pakistan with some
concern in recent years. A little over a year ago we were gravely
concerned at a prolonged period of confrontation and the risk of
hostilities between two nuclear-capable states. Correspondingly,
Australia has welcomed the more recent positive trend in India-Pakistan,
with the resumption of full diplomatic relations and plans to restore
transport links. Prime Minister Vajpayee's speech in Srinagar on
18 April was a very commendable first public step in a process that
has real potential to create an environment in which the difficult
issues in the India-Pakistan relationship can be addressed. Courageous
and far-sighted leadership on both sides will be crucial to this
enterprise of peace. At the same time, there is a need for Pakistan
to take concrete action to ensure militant organisations and individuals
do not use its territory to strike against India. The democratic
election process in Jammu and Kashmir last year underlined that
terrorist violence has no part in building a future for Kashmiris.
Economic policies to increase trade
and investment, for the welfare of the people of India, are a thread
common to all of India's international relationships. As an influential
developing country in the World Trade Organisation India is particularly
well placed to play an important role in keeping the WTO negotiations
on track, including in the fifth WTO Ministerial Meeting in Cancun
a few months from now.
India is seeking to encourage a more
liberal trading environment in its region, through the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and its South Asian
Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA), and by negotiations on
new agreements with regional neighbours, in addition to its successful
free trade agreement with Sri Lanka. Like Australia, India recognises
the potential for the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional
Cooperation (IOR-ARC) to promote closer economic engagement within
the wider Indian Ocean region, through forms of trade and investment
facilitation that provide direct benefits to business.
One vital nexus of India's economic,
security and foreign policy concerns is the need to ensure a reliable
supply of energy to sustain the country's economic development needs
and ambitions in the decades ahead. India openly acknowledges its
dependence on energy imports and its requirement for what it characterises
as "energy security". This is an increasingly apparent
element of India's engagement with a wide variety of states, whether
potential energy suppliers or other energy importers with which
India has common interests in ensuring the protection of transit
routes, including sea lanes.
Finally, India's international outlook
is increasingly taking account of a latent reservoir of what it
is now fashionable to define as "soft power" - the extraordinary
Indian diaspora. Many years of people-to-people interlinkages, through
migration, education, business and cultural exchange, are now beginning
to pay dividends. Indian diaspora communities have found effective
voice in a range of countries, including the United States. And
is recognising these communities as its own - for instance through
the introduction earlier this year of some dual citizenship arrangements.
India's cultural exports, too, should not be overlooked in the context
of its foreign policy interests. India moved quickly to re-establish
a diplomatic presence in post-Taliban Afghanistan, and some of the
most welcome cargo on the first flight from Delhi to Kabul was a
box of videos - of Bollywood films with all their colour, drame
and exuberance.
Opportunities for Australia
What does all of this mean for Australia?
At the very least, it provides a context for our relations with
India. These are times of change and we need to be actively engaged
with India, as we are. But while Australia might matter to India
in some ways, so do many countries. If a country has a reason to
want New Delhi's attention, it may have to compete, given the widespread
recognition that India's weight in international affairs is increasing.
Both Australia and India are pursuing
many interests in many directions. Our interests will not always
be the first to intersect, and ours are two countries which will
never be all things to one another. But which two countries are?
What I think is more noteworthy is
that have substantial converging interests, due in part to the changing
international environment. Second, we have developed a strong diversity
of interaction. And third, the strengthening of the relationship
has been rapid.
Three positive features are borne
out when one looks at the four key areas of political, economic,
strategic and people-to-people links. In each area, there are clear
opportunities.
The political relationship
There is a substantial and steady exchange of Ministerial visits
and interactions. The most recent was the visit to India in February
2003 by Minister for Trade Mr Vaile for the Joint Ministerial Commission
with Indian Commerce and Industry Minister Arun Jaitley, as well
as for discussions with the Ministers for Finance, Agriculture,
Petroleum and Natural Gas, and Education.
Indian External Affairs Minister Yashwant
Sinha is scheduled to visit Australia in August for the next bilateral
Foreign Ministers Framework Dialogue, following Mr Downer's visit
to India in April last year. And we hope that Prime Minister Vajpayee's
postponed visit to Australia also takes place later this year, reciprocating
the visit to India by Mr Howard in 2000.
There is also typically close and
growing contact between Australian and Indian Ministers in international
forums where both countries have significant common interests, such
as the WTO.
These Ministerial-level contacts are
underpinned by a widening and deepening range of official dialogues.
Foremost among these are Senior Officials Talks, the most recent
round of which was held in Delhi in mid-2002 at the level of DFAT
Secretary Dr Calvert. The bilateral Strategic Dialogue was established
in 2001, following the visit to Australia by Jaswant Singh in his
then capacity as both External Affairs and Defence Minister. This
mechanism attained considerably greater importance with the addition
of subgroups dealing with defence, counter-terrorism and immigration
issues when its second round was held in Canberra in March 2003.
On the economic front, as well as
the involvement of officials in the Joint Ministerial Commission,
and the related Joint Business Council, there are sector-specific
economic dialogues, which also include representation by the business
community of each country: the Joint Working Group on Energy and
Minerals; and the Joint Business Group on Natural Fibres and Textiles.
Given the federal model of both our
countries, it is not surprising that state governments are emerging
as valuable players in the development of the relationship. The
conclusion earlier this year of two Memoranda of Understanding between
the dynamic states of Queensland and Karnataka - one on state-state
partnership and one on higher education - is a case in point, part
of a visit by Premier Beattie and a delegation pursuing interests
ranging from biotechnology to mining.
Trade and investment
The economic relationship is robust and growing; each year since
1999 it has reached a new high. That same year India became Australia’s
12th largest export market. Two-way trade reached AUD3.4 billion
in 2002, maintaining an average increase of 6.5 percent a year over
five years, despite this being a period of regional and global downturn
in demand. While bilateral trade is balanced in Australia’s
favour, its expansion has been in both directions.
Along with exports, Australian investment
is playing a key role in Indian economic growth. The Indian Government
has identified Australia as its eighth-largest foreign investor.
That investment is now more than AUD1 billion, much of it in fast-growing
service sectors including IT, education, health, tourism, and leisure,
media and finance, as well as mining and niche manufacturing. Increasingly,
Australia is supplying industrial, agricultural and other products
and services required by Indian manufacturers and consumers. For
India, investment in Australia may be quite small but it is growing,
with much of it in IT and the important energy and minerals sector
(including copper mines and an ammonia plant).
This exciting rise in business engagement,
of benefit to both countries, is linked to continuing growth in
both economies and, importantly, to the ongoing economic transformation
of both countries - in particular India's ongoing domestic economic
liberalisation and reform.
The energy sector has been identified
as of particular importance. Given India's growing energy needs,
it is natural that interest is quickening in India in Australia's
mining and energy technology and capabilities. India's Minister
for Petroleum and Gas, Ram Naik is in Western Australia today, promoting
Australian investment in India's latest hydrocarbon prospective
blocks. The Minister for Mines Ramesh Bais, is planning a visit
to WA and Qld in the coming weeks and a coal delegation is in prospect
in September. Australian coal has long been a vital input into India’s
industrial sector. Looking towards the energy of the future, Australia’s
profile as a major supplier of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) has risen
following last year's A$25 billion contract to supply China. Natural
gas consumption is projected to rise strongly in India. India represents
the largest emerging gas market in the Asia Pacific region. While
the Middle East may be a natural supplier to western India, Australia
is well located to be a reliable supplier to eastern India.
The strategic relationship
Moving to the domain of security proper, geography certainly is
one factor in the convergent interests of our countries. Descriptions
of Australia and India as Indian Ocean neighbours are more than
just symbolic when one sees the proximity of India's Andaman and
Nicobar Islands to Christmas Island. But most of all it is shifting
global and geopolitical realities - such as the threat of international
terrorism - which point toward convergence of interests and the
logic of engagement.
At a time when much of the world is
preoccupied with strategic uncertainty, it is noteworthy that Australia
and India recognise one another as factors for stability in the
Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions. This point was made formally
in a joint statement issued after their inaugural bilateral strategic
dialogue in August 2001.
That dialogue was a significant step
forward, substantive as well as symbolic, in a relationship, which
had passed through a difficult period in the aftermath of India’s
1998 nuclear tests. For the first time, officials and uniformed
officers from both sides met to share perspectives on a full range
of global and regional security issues.
The success of that first formal dialogue,
and an increasingly apparent convergence of security interests,
including in addressing terrorism, helped influence both governments
to expand the dialogue when it was held for a second time in March
this year, raising the level of representation and adding subgroups
on defence, counter-terrorism and immigration.
In conjunction with the enhancement
of the strategic dialogue, the Australian and Indian Governments
reached agreement in March 2003 on the text of a Memorandum of Understanding
on Counter-Terrorism, which will be an important addition to the
web of agreements both countries are developing with partners against
terrorism. We expect this will be signed in August.
The wider defence relationship, which
includes staff college exchanges and ship visits, has grown quickly
since restoration of formal defence relations in 2000. This relationship
holds real promise, building on a growing recognition of shared
interests including in the Indian Ocean and on maritime and sea
lane security issues.
This was underlined earlier this month
when the frigate HMAS Adelaide visited Chennai on a dedicated goodwill
visit, and took part in an exercise with an Indian vessel. At the
same time Maritime Commander Rear Admiral Gates was meeting Indian
counterparts to discuss next steps in developing an active relationship
between the two navies.
People-to-people links
In political relations, trade and investment, and security, then,
the news is good. However what I have found particularly striking
- sometimes surprising - is the growing diversity and depth of “people-to-people”
connections. This second track will help ensure the bilateral statecraft
of our Governments translates into permanent outcomes. Australians
and Indians are building professional and personal interaction,
in education, tourism, business, culture, development cooperation,
medicine, science and sport; in shared workplaces and in university
campuses; in exposure to one another’s artistic triumphs,
and of course on the cricket field.
The strength of the contemporary people-to-people
connection between these two countries cannot simply be explained
as a product of longstanding bonds, such as democratic systems of
government, the Commonwealth or the English language. Cricket remains
a tremendous window between our two societies, but in recent years
Indians have come to know Australia for much, much more.
The Indian community in Australia
has grown and is increasingly active, playing an important part
in building the strength and dynamism of Australia’s society
and economy.
The number of young Indians studying
at Australian universities has grown dramatically (currently 9,000,
a manifold increase on the figure a decade ago). Australia is the
third most popular overseas destination for Indian tertiary students,
and vies closely for second place. This surging education relationship
inevitably will enmesh the wider Australian and Indian societies
with one another. Education is an avenue for identifying and taking
advantage of synergies between the two countries' experience and
expertise. Both countries, for instance, have reputations for excellence
in biotechnology research, and this has become one among a number
of priority areas for building educational links.
Tourist and business travel in both
directions continues to grow significantly. The Indian film industry's
use of Australian locations and production facilities - helped actively
by Australian government bodies - has helped literally to show the
way. Last year Australia and India signed a memorandum of understanding
to promote bilateral tourism. But while the double-digit growth
that bilateral tourism has seen in recent years is of course impressive,
we should see it as a starting point, for the incomes and horizons
of middle-class India are continuing to expand.
Finally, I cannot speak of people-to-people
connections without mentioning the Australia-India Council or AIC,
the bilateral council funded by the Government through the Department
of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Working closely with my High Commission,
the AIC had enhanced a broad range of links, including institutional,
cultural, educational, medical, scientific, sporting and media.
Conclusion
When one measures India's changing external outlook against the
state of Australia-India relations, and what we know of Australia's
strengths and its own national interest and external outlook, some
opportunities become starkly apparent. If I was to identify three
priority areas, I would say:
First: education, an investment in people-to-people relations
Second: trade and investment, especially in IT, biotechnology and
the energy sector
And third: closer strategic and defence relations, especially in
maritime security and counter-terrorism.
None of this is to say that the relationship has yet reached its
full potential, or that the process of improvement is automatic.
In many areas of joint enterprise, the journey remains at an early
stage, and the challenge for our Governments will be to continue
identifying and seizing the opportunities for practical partnership
in policy and action. It is also a challenge for all of us who are
interested in the bilateral relationship - including the business
community.
We need to stay realistic about what can be achieved, how to get
there, and how long it will take. But what is certain is that this
bridge across the Indian Ocean is one worth building.
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